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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
REPLY TO MATTERS RAISED IN INITIAL APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TEMPORARY RECEIPT BY THE LIMITED PARTNERS OF TAX 
BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABORTIVE PURCHASE OF THE 
PRESS BY THE LIMITED PARTNERS IS NOT CONSIDERATION 
Continental Bank argues that because the Limited Partners 
received "substantial profit potential and significant tax 
No. 880111 
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advantages", they received their bargain for consideration for 
executing the Limited Partnership Agreement. The problem with 
that response is that the Bank fails to recognize the differ-
ence between the defense of lack of consideration as opposed 
to failure of consideration. Certainly those factors could 
well comprise adequate consideration and could be used to 
defeat an argument based upon lack of consideration. But the 
facts in this case are undisputed in that the Press was 
delivered, assembled, and then repossessed. The Partnership 
went into bankruptcy and ultimately turned the Press over to R 
& P for sale indicating their intent not to consummate the 
transaction. The entire res of the Limited Partnership 
Agreement was destroyed. The purpose of the Partnership and 
the reason the Limited Partners consented to join therein was 
to acquire a very expensive printing press to operate that 
press with the objective of generating sufficient revenue to 
pay at least part, if not most, of the purchase price thereof. 
The Limited Partners were only agreeing to put in additional 
capital in the event the Partnership was unable to generate 
sufficient cash flow from its printing operations to make the 
monthly payments as they became due. But when the Partnership 
elected to close its doors and file for bankruptcy, and turn 
its sole physical asset back to the original seller, the 
entire purpose for the Partnership has been frustrated and 
terminated. As pointed out in the Opening Brief, additional 
capital contributions required by the Limited Partners were 
2 
ear-marked specifically for the purpose of "acquiring" the 
printing press. If the Partnership cannot use those funds and 
"acquire" the Press, for the simple reason that the Press has 
been sold to another party, it is axiomatic that the Limited 
Partners cannot be compelled to contribute money for that 
contractually expressed purpose. 
As to the receipt and use by the Partners of the tempor-
ary tax benefits associated with purchase of the Press by the 
Partnership, the Court can take notice that under the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954, §§38 and 47, the Limited Partners were 
required to recapture all of the tax advantages because they 
did not keep possession of the Press for the requisite period 
of time and made an involuntary disposition of the Press. 
POINT II 
THE DETERMINATION BY THE BANKRUPTCY COURT THAT THE 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT REQUIRING ADDITIONAL 
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION WAS EXECUTORY IN NATURE IS 
EITHER BINDING UNDER COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR 
SHOULD BE GIVEN DEFERENCE BY THIS COURT. 
The decision by the Bankruptcy Judge that the Limited 
Partnership Agreement constituted an executory contract is 
either barred by collateral estoppel or should be given 
considerable deference by this Court. 
The Bank's response to this argument is that the apparent 
ruling by the Bankruptcy Court as evidenced by the entry in 
Exhibit 109 that the Order constitutes an entry made by 
"perhaps an ill-informed clerk" is a totally unwarranted 
3 
supposition. While it is acknowledged that said minute entry 
is not to be given the same effect as a finding or final 
judgment entered by Judge Mai, such minute entries are 
maintained for the purpose of determining the reason for 
interim orders of the Court and should either be given great 
deference by this Court as a determination made on an issue by 
a United States District Judge having expertise in bankruptcy 
matters or, alternatively, must be binding under the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel. 
REPLY TO MATTERS RAISED IN CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE GUARANTY AGREEMENTS ARE TO 
BE INTERPRETED AND ENFORCED 
PURSUANT TO ILLINOIS LAW 
The Guaranty Agreements for all Limited Partners, as 
completed, contained the following: 
This guaranty has been made and delivered at 
Des Plaines, Illinois and shall be governed by the 
laws of the State of Illinois. (Exhibits 59 to 77) 
Illinois follows a "strict construction" rule in inter-
preting and enforcing guaranty agreements. 
It is best to begin our analysis with the rules 
of construction applicable to the interpretation and 
construction of guaranty agreements. It is a rule 
that guaranty agreements be strictly construed in 
favor of the guarantor and that a guarantor's 
liability cannot be extended by construction. (King 
Korn Stamp Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. (1969) , 
114 111. App. 2d 428. 252 N.E. 2d 734 (emphasis 
added))• 
* * * 
4 
A guarantor is a favorite of the law and may 
stand on the strict terms of his obligation when 
such terms are ascertained. (Farmers State Bank v. 
Doering, 80 111. App. 3d 959, 36 111. Dec. 285, 400 
N.E* 2d 705, 707 (1980) (emphasis added)). 
* * * 
Looking thus at•the contract and construing the 
guaranty most favorably for the guarantor, we must 
agree with the plaintiff's argument. In considering 
the guaranty agreement the rule is that is must be 
strictly construed and the liability of a guarantor 
cannot be extended by construction. (King Korn 
Stamp Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 114 111. 
App. 2d 428, 252 N.E. 2d 734, 739 (1969) (emphasis 
added)). 
* * * 
As defendants contend, guaranty agreements must 
be strictly construed in favor of the guarantor. 
(Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Stephans, 97 111. 
App. 3d 683, 52 111. Dec. 927, 422 N.E. 2d 1136, 
1140 (1981)). 
* * * 
It is elementary that a guarantor is not liable 
for anything which he did not agree to and if the 
creditor and principal have entered into an agree-
ment materially different from that contemplated by 
the instrument of guaranty, the guarantor shall be 
released. 
* * * 
The promisor is properly favored to the extent 
that he is permitted to stand upon the exact letter 
of his bond, in the sense that no condition or 
obligations may be imposed by implication, and that 
no construction should be made which will hold him 
liable beyond the express terms of his engagement. 
(Claude So. Corp. v. Henry's Drive-In, Inc., 51 111. 
App. 2d 289, 201 N.E. 2d 127, 132 (1964). See also, 
Dee v. Bank of Oakwood Terrace, 84 111. App. 3d 
1022, 406 N.E. 2d 195, 198 (1980); Lee v. Pioneer 
State Bank, 97 111. App. 3d 97, 423 N.E. 2d 218, 220 
(1981); Allied Coal and Mining Co. v. Andrews, 318 
111. App. 415, 48 N.E. 2d 563, 566 (1943)). 
5 
The significance and operative effect of these basic 
tenants of judicial conduct and construction cannot be over 
emphasized. The Limited Partners stand before this Court in a 
favored position, a position created by Illinois courts 
specifically for their protection and advantage. Every 
presumption of invalidity, is, therefore, in their favor, and 
the Court must look at the Guaranty Agreements with the utmost 
skepticism. 
POINT II 
THE GUARANTY AGREEMENTS WERE PREPARED BY 
CONTINENTAL BANK AND ARE, THEREFORE, 
CONSTRUED AGAINST ITS INTERESTS 
The blank Guaranty Agreements were submitted to Color 
Craft by R & P but were, in fact, prepared and approved by 
Continental Bank prior to submission to the Limited Partners. 
(Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 244-245) 
As author of the printed text of the Guaranty Agreement, 
the text is construed most strongly against the Bank. 
First, the guaranty forms here were prepared 
and submitted by the plaintiff [bank]. Thus, we 
should construe the agreement in favor of the 
guarantor and not extend the guarantor's liability 
by construction. (Farmers State Bank v. Doerinq, 80 
111. App. 3d 959, 36 111. Dec. 285, (1980)). 
* * * 
In these transactions it is generally the 
lender who prepares the instrument, and its provi-
sions are, in accordance with the established rule, 
construed most strongly against it. (Fannin State 
Bank v. Grossman, 30 111. App. 2d 484, 175 N.E. 2d 
268, 270 (1961) (emphasis added)). 
* * * 
6 
Again, the form used for the guaranty of June 4 
was a printed form prepared by defendants and will, 
therefore, in case of ambiguity, be construed 
against defendants and in favor of plaintiff. 
(Kesner v. Farroll, 268 111. App. 531, 540 (1932)). 
POINT III 
THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE FAILURE OF ALL LIMITED 
PARTNERS TO SIGN GUARANTY AGREEMENTS, A REQUIREMENT IMPOSED 
BY R & P AND THE BANK, WAS A CONDITION PRECEDENT WHICH 
COULD NOT BE WAIVED AND BARS ENFORCEMENT OF THE GUARANTIES 
The Trial Court's findings on this issue are unequivocal 
and are amply supported in both fact and law. All of the 
Limited Partners must sign pro-rata personal guaranties. It 
was an absolute '"requirement" upon which the "whole transac-
tion was predicated". (R. 2412, Findings of Fact, Par. 8;; 
Exhibit 106, p. 2, Par. 5, 2nd sentence; Trans. Vol. II, pp. 
353, 351-52, 382; R. 2421, Conclusions of Law, Pars. 3-4) 
The Illinois law relative to this issue is clear and 
concise. It has not changed in the century following its 
announcement in Belleville Savings Bank v. Bornman, 124 111. 
200, 16 N.E. 210 (1888), a decision cited and followed in the 
recent and controlling decision by the Illinois Supreme Court 
in State Bank of East Moline v. Cirivello, 74 111. 2d 426, 24 
111. Dec. 839, 386 N.E. 2d 43 (1978). 
In Cirivello the Court addressed two issues: 
Disposition of this cause requires us to 
resolve the following two questions: (1) Was the 
guaranty agreement conditioned upon the signatures 
of all 13 limited partners? and (2) If the guaranty 
was conditional, could the bank waive the condition 
by advancing the loan? (Jdf., at 45). 
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The salient facts in Cirivello are so identical with the 
case at bar as to appear hand tailored specifically for the 
purpose of disposing of this case. They are as follows: 
1. A limited partnership existed comprised of 
13 limited partners. {Id., at 44). 
2. The limited partnership negotiated a loan 
from the State Bank of East Moline in the amount of 
$65#000. (Jd., at 44). 
3. The Bank told one of the partners (Cook) 
that all the limited partners would have to sign a 
personal guaranty before the loan would be advanced. 
(Jd., at 44). 
4. The Bank supplied the printed guaranty 
forms to be signed by all the limited partners. 
(Jd., at 44). 
5. The limited partners were told by one of 
the other limited partners of the Bank's condition 
that all limited partners sign personal guaranties. 
(Jd., at 45). 
6. One of the 13 limited partners failed or 
refused to sign the guaranty forms. (Jd., at 45). 
7. When the guaranties from the 12 who did 
sign were received, the Bank noted there was "one 
more to come." (Jd., at 45). 
8. The Bank received financial statements on 
all 13 limited partners. (Jd., at 45). 
9. The Bank never obtained the 13th signature 
on the guaranty and never informed the 12 who signed 
that one of their group had not signed. (Jd., at 
45) . 
10. The written guaranty form did not state on 
its face any condition that all limited partners 
must sign to be enforceable. (Jd., at 45). 
11. The Court ruled the parol evidence rule 
did not bar extrinsic evidence to show the incom-
pleteness of the guaranties and failure of a 
condition precedent to the enforceability therein. 
(Jd., at 46, citing Belleville, supra, United States 
a 
v. Everett Monte Cristo Hotel, Inc., 524 F.2d 127, 
130 (9th Cir0 1975); 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, Sec. 
634 (3d Ed. 1961)). 
On those facts, the trial court ruled that the Guaranty 
Agreements were unenforceable and gave judgment to the limited 
partners. The Bank appealed and the Appellate Court in a 2 to 
1 decision reversed holding that the Bank did not have actual 
notice, prior to granting the loan, of and from the limited 
partners that each limited partner was intending to impose a 
condition to enforceability that all of the limited partners 
sign a personal guaranty of the indebtedness. 
In this case, the record fails to show indica-
tion of any condition as to the defendants' guaran-
ties to the plaintiff bank. (State Bank of East 
Moline v. Cirivello, 56 111. App. 3d 269, 273 (App. 
Ct. 1978)). 
Moreover, the Appellate Court held that since it was the 
Bank who had imposed the condition that all 13 limited 
partners sign personal guaranties, the Bank could waive the 
condition if it wanted: 
While [the Bank] had stated that all limited 
partners would be required to sign the guaranty, it 
clearly waived this requirement and made the loan on 
the basis of the 12 guaranties. (Id.) 
Justice Barry dissented, noting: 
The evidence is not disputed that the plaintiff 
bank required all 13 limited partners as guarantors 
to this loan transaction and so communicated this 
requirement to the partnership and all the partners. 
It seems to me to be a meaningless task to 
require the guarantor to notify the plaintiff bank 
of the condition of the guaranty which was required 
by the plaintiff in the first place. It is undi-
sputed that the bank intended, at least initially, 
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for all 13 limited partners to be bound as guaran-
tors of the loan and that plaintiff, therefore, had 
actual knowledge of this condition. The evidence in 
the record also readily supports a conclusion that 
the 12 defendants who signed as guarantors intended 
the condition to be operative when they executed the 
agreement. 
The majority opinion would allow the plaintiff 
to unilaterally rescind the operation of the 
condition of all 13 limited partners signing as 
guarantors, and thereby unilaterally change the 
obligations of the contract contrary to the inten-
tion of the parties at the inception of their 
contract. The evidence of the parties' intention in 
entering into the contract is at odds with the 
result reached in the majority opinion and I, 
therefore, respectfully dissent. (Id., at 275-76; 
dissenting opinion) (emphasis added). 
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted, unani-
mously, the dissent of Justice Barry, reversing the Appellate 
Court, and reinstating the dismissal of all the limited 
partners. In doing so, it clearly articulated the controlling 
law in this case. As to the issue of whether the limited 
partners need expressly inform the Bank of the condition that 
all limited partners sign, the Court held: 
The bank contends that there is no evidence 
whatsoever that defendants imposed a condition on 
the guaranty or that they communicated any condition 
to the bank. Our examination of the record dis-
closes that this is true, but beside the point. The 
basis of the trial court's finding was that the 
bank, through the representations of its president, 
premised the guaranty upon the condition that all 13 
limited partners sign and that the defendants 
accepted these terms by signing the guaranty forms 
and delivering the forms to the bank. If there is 
sufficient factual support for the trial court to 
have drawn this conclusion, certainly the law does 
not require that the defendants reiterate the 
condition to the bank. (386 N.E. 2d at 46) (empha-
sis added)• 
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As to the issue of whether the Bank, as author of the 
condition that all limited partners sign, could unilaterally 
waive the condition, the Court held: 
Having affirmed the factual finding that the 
guaranty was conditional, we must address whether 
the bank could waive the condition by advancing the 
loan. We hold that it may not. As we have already 
stated, the condition, though initiated by the bank, 
contemplated that the guaranty would not become 
operative unless all 13 limited partners agreed to 
stand behind the loan. By issuing the loan, the 
bank materially increased the proportionate liabil-
ity of those who had signed. In addition, failure 
to secure James Patten as a co-signed guarantor 
deprived the defendants of their equitable right of 
contribution against him. (See Weger v. Robinson 
Nash Motor Co. (1930), 340 111. 81, 94, 175 N.E. 7; 
20 111. L. & Prac. Guaranty sec. 102 (1956)). When 
the bank's demand that all 13 limited partners 
guaranty the loan became a condition to the liabil-
ity of those who signed the guaranty, it could not 
be unilaterally waived by the bank. (Td., at 46-
47). 
Cirivello is the most recent and concise pronouncement of 
Illinois law on this subject and is dispositive of all the 
claims herein based upon the written Guaranty Agreements. 
Cirivello involved limited partners who were signing 
joint and several guaranties for 100% of the total indebted-
ness of $65,000. Under the principal of equitable contribu-
tion among partners, the 12 who signed, by virtue of the 
Bank's failure to obtain one more signature, had an increase 
in their net liability from l/13th of $65,000 or $5,000 to 
l/12th of $65,000 or $5,416.66, or a net increase of $416.66. 
In the case at bar, the 21 limited partners who signed 
Guaranty Agreements represented 19 1/2 of 28 total Class "&" 
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partnership units. By the Bank not obtaining signatures from 
the remaining 10 limited partners owning 8 1/2 units, the 
consequence is even more pronounced and detrimental to the 
Color Craft partners than the Cirivello partners. If all 31 
Limited Partners (28 Units) signed guaranties, their net 
liability, assuming equal contribution by all limited partners 
would be: , 28 $6,221,258.20 = $222,187.79 each. But, if 
only 21 Limited Partners (19.5 Units) were obligated the net 
liability would be: 19.5 $6,221,258.20 = $319,038.88 each, 
or a net increase per partnership unit of $96.851.091 
If there was ever any doubt as to the applicability of 
Cirivello to cases, like that at bar, where the Limited 
Partners were guarantying only a pro-rata share of the total 
indebtedness, the doubt was removed by the Illinois Appellate 
Courts in applying the Cirivello doctrine to pro-rata guaran-
tors. In Mount Prospect State Bank v. Forestry Recycling 
Sawmill, 93 111. App. 3d 448, 48 111. Dec. 889, 417 N.E. 2d 
621 (App. Ct. 1981) a limited partnership borrowed $343,740.00 
with the Bank imposing a condition of personal guaranties by 
all limited partners, but the guaranties were pro rata and not 
for the full amount of the loan: 
Limited Partner Maximum Liability 
Neiman $19,000 
Thomas 38,000 
Abrams 76,000 
Collins 38,000 
Laker 19,000 
$190,000 
(417 N.E. 2d at 624) 
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Both the Bank and the Limited Partners, however, under-
stood there would be 19, Limited Partners and that all Limited 
Partners would sign Guaranty Agreements. 
As part of the inducement to become limited 
partners and guarantors of the loan to be made by 
Bank, they were told by Goldstein that there would 
be 25 limited partnership units to be purchased by 
19 limited partners, each of whom would become co-
guarantors on the loan. Goldstein showed them a 
list of the 19 limited partners, which list indi-
cated the amounts to be invested by each limited 
partner. (Id., at 625). 
In reversing a Summary Judgment against the Limited 
Partners who had signed guaranties, the Court held: 
A contract of guaranty may be conditional on 
others becoming co-guarantors and the contract is 
unenforceable if this condition is not met. (State 
Bank of East Moline v. Cirivello (1978), 74 111. 2d 
426, 24 111. Dec. 839, 386 N.E. 2d 43; Belleville 
Savings Bank v. Bornman (1888), 124 111. 200, 16 
N.E. 210.) Also, the parol evidence rule does not 
bar the use of extrinsic evidence to establish that 
this condition existed. (State Bank of East Moline 
v. Cirivello (1978), 74 111. 2d 426, 24 111. Dec. 
8398, 386 N.E. 2d 43.) Although this condition is 
usually one imposed by the guarantors, either the 
creditor or guarantor may premise the guaranty on 
this condition, and if the condition is known and 
agreed upon by the parties, it becomes a part of the 
guaranty. (State Bank of East Moline v. Cirivello 
(1978), 74 111. 2d 426, 24 111. Dec. 839, 386 N.E.2d 
43; see United States v. Everett Monte Cristo Hotel, 
Inc. (9th Cir. 1975), 524 F.2d 127.) Additionally, 
if a bank conditions the making of a loan on the 
receipt of contracts of guaranty from several 
persons and the bank makes known this condition to 
the potential guarantors, who enter into their 
contracts of guaranty in reasonable reliance on the 
bank's representation, the condition becomes a part 
of the contracts of guaranty even though the loan 
agreement and guaranty agreements are different 
contracts and even though the guarantors fail to 
communicate to the bank that they agreed to the 
condition or insisted upon it. See State Bank of 
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East Moline v. Cirivello (1978), 74 111. 2d 426, 24 
111. Dec. 839, 386 N.E. 2d 43. 
In the present case, we believe a genuine issue 
of material fact exists as to whether a condition to 
the contracts of guaranty was that all the limited 
partners become co-guarantors. There is also a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether this 
condition was met. (Id., at 628-29). 
Illinois, on this point, stands four-square with the 
general principles of law adopted by a majority of jurisdic-
tions and leading treatise on the subject: 
Where the surety signs an instrument by which 
his obligation is in terms conditional upon an-
other's signing the same instrument as principal or 
as cosurety, the surety is not bound unless the 
other signs the instrument. (Restatement of Law 
"Surety", §101(1)). 
* * * 
Where a guarantor delivers a guaranty subject 
to the condition precedent that others will also 
guaranty the debt, he is not liable unless the other 
guarantors do sign. (L. Simpson, SURETYSHIP §53 
(1950); J. Elder, STEARNS ON SURETYSHIP §7.10 (5th 
ed. 1951), cited and followed in United States v. 
Everett Monte Cristo Hotel, 524 F.2d 127, 130 (9th 
Cir. 1975)). 
* * * 
A conditional guaranty contemplates, as a 
condition to liability on the part of the guarantor, 
the happening of some contingent event (other that 
the default of the principal debtor, or the perform-
ance of some act on the part of the creditor. In its 
inception, the promise of the guarantor is nothing 
more than an offer for a bilateral or a unilateral 
contract. Thus, the guarantor may condition the 
acceptance or the enforceability of his offer of 
guaranty on the occurrence (or the non-occurrence) 
of any fact or event, and the occurrence (or the 
non-occurrence) of that fact or event is a necessary 
condition precedent to liability under the guaranty. 
The obligation of the guarantor will not be enforced 
unless the specific fact or event has occurred (or 
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failed to occur) . (38 Am. Jur. 2d, "GUARANTY" §21 
p. 1020-21 (1968)). 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NEVER A MEETING OF THE MINDS AS TO THE SALIENT 
TERMS AND PROVISIONS OF THE GUARANTY AGREEMENTS 
ALLOWING REFORMATION OF THE GUARANTY AGREEMENTS 
Again, the Trial Court's specific findings on this issue 
are amply supported in law and fact. The Court found that the 
"amount" to be guarantied "was always communicated to and 
understood by the Limited Partners to be in the range of 
$3,000,000." (R. 2414, Findings of Fact, Par. 11; Exhibit 12: 
Exhibit 32; Exhibit 36) The partnerships prior experience and 
practice was to have partners guaranty only the principal of 
acquisition indebtedness. (Id., Exhibits 4, 5, 6; Trans. Vol. 
II, p. 238,309) But, the parties never discussed nor agreed 
upon a figure; nor could the figure be calculated from the 
written and signed documents. (R. 2416-2419; Findings of Fact, 
Pars. 15-21) 
There is no question that under the proper facts and 
circumstances there lies within the Courts equity jurisdiction 
the power to reform written agreements, but invocation of that 
power must always be undertaken with extreme caution and only 
after the Court is convinced by the quantum and quality of 
evidence to change the written document. 
Courts of equity, in the exercise of their 
jurisdiction to reform written instruments, must 
proceed with the utmost caution. . . While the 
remedy is well recognized, it is not to be adminis-
tered arbitrarily, and the right to have a court of 
equity decree the reformation of a written instru-
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ment is not absolute. (66 Am. Jur. 2d §3 "Reforma-
tion of Instruments", p. 528) (citations omitted). 
Accordingly, courts of equity act sparingly in 
the reformation of written instruments. . . (Id., 
at 528). 
Reformation is a remedy not easily won. 
(Nat'2. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. D & L Const. Co., 353 
F.2d 169 (CA 8 1965), cert, den., 384 U.S. 941, 16 
L.Ed 2d 539, 86 S.Ct. 1462). 
In an action for reformation, much stronger and 
clearer evidence is required than in an ordinary 
action for damages. The high remedy of reformation 
is never granted on a probability, or a mere 
preponderance of evidence. The strict requirements 
relate not only to the mistake and the mutuality 
thereof . . . but also to the real agreement which 
is alleged to have been made. 
* * * 
. . . It is frequently laid down, for example, 
that the proof must be clear and convincing, or 
clear and satisfactory, or clear, satisfactory and 
convincing, and to these requirements some courts 
have added other expressions, such as that the proof 
must be strong, cogent, specific, exact, precise, 
unequivocal, indubitable, and decisive. Still other 
expressions are that the proof must establish the 
facts to a moral certainty; must take the question 
out of the range of reasonable controversy; and must 
be so clear as to establish the fact beyond cavil. 
(66 Am. Jur. 2d §123 "Reformation of Instruments" p. 
647-649) (footnotes omitted). 
Under Illinois law the proof of the mutual mistake must 
be by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. It must 
be proven by "very strong, clear and convincing evidence" 
which leaves "no reasonable doubt." 
In a reformation suit, the plaintiff has a higher 
burden of proof than in an ordinary civil litiga-
tion, and must prove a case by very strong, clear 
and convincing evidence." (319 South La Salle Corp. 
V. Lopin, 19 111. App. 3d 285, 311 N.E. 2d 288, 291 
(1974) citing State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. 
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Hanson, 1 111. App. 3d 678, 288 N.E. 2d 523 (1972); 
followed in B. L. Kelley v. Riverside Boulevard Ind. 
Church of God, 44 111. App. 3d 673, 3 111. Dec. 298, 
358 N.E. 2d 696, 707 (1976)). 
[T]he evidence must leave no reasonable doubt as to 
the mutual intention of the parties. . . (Kolkovich 
v. Tosolin, 19 111. App. 3d 524, 311 N.E. 2d 782, 
786 (1974)). 
More importantly, in reforming the contract the Court 
cannot and must not become involved in adding to the agreement 
terms and provisions to which the parties had never agreed. 
Courts should proceed with great caution in reform-
ing written instruments. (Booth v. Cole Corp., 121 
111. App. 2d 77, 257 N.E.2d 265 (1970)). The court 
may not make a new agreement for the parties under 
color of reforming the one made by them, nor can it 
add a provision which the parties never agree upon. 
(Kolkovich Vc Tosolin, 19 111. App. 3d 524, 311 N.E. 
2d 782, 786 (1974)) (emphasis added). 
* * * 
But it is not the province of courts to interpolate 
new terms into contracts against the evident 
intentions of the parties. (Castle v. Powell, 261 
111. App. 132, 141 (1931), citing, Robinson v. Stow, 
39 111. 568, 572 (1864)). 
The party seeking reformation must establish that the 
parties knew, understood, and agreed upon all the essential 
terms sought to be "reformed" into the agreement. 
Inasmuch as the relief sought in reforming a 
written instrument is to make it conform to the real 
agreement or intention of the parties, a definite 
intention or agreement on which the minds of the 
parties had met must have pre-existed the instrument 
in question. (66 Am. Jur. 2d §4 "Reformation of 
Instruments," p. 529) (emphasis added). 
* * * 
The purpose of reformation is to effectuate the 
common intention of both parties which was incor-
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rectly reduced to writing. To obtain the benefit of 
this statute, it is necessary that the parties shall 
have had a complete mutual understanding of all the 
essential terms of their bargain; if no agreement 
was reached, there would be no standard to which the 
writing could be reformed. (McConnel v. Pickering 
Lumber Corp., 217 F.2d 44, 49 (9th Cir. 1954) 
citing, Bailard v. Harden, 36 Cal.2d 703, 227 P.2d 
10 (1951)). 
* * * 
There can be no reformation unless there is a 
preliminary or prior agreement, either written or 
verbal, between the parties. . . there must have 
been an understanding between the parties on all 
essential terms, otherwise there would be no 
standard to which the writing can be reformed. (66 
Am. Jur. 2d §4 "Reformation of Instruments," p. 529) 
(emphasis added). 
* * * 
Both parties must have understood the contract 
as it ought to have been and in fact was, except for 
the mistake. (66 Am. Jur. 2d §4 "Reformation of 
Instruments," p. 529). 
* * * 
Although a court of equity may revise a written 
instrument to make it conform to the real agreement, 
it has no power to make a new contract for the 
parties, whether the mistake be mutual or unila-
teral. (Lemoge Electric v. County of San Mateo, 297 
P.2d 638, 641 (Cal. 1956); see also, Burt v. Los 
Angeles Olive Growers Ass'n., 175 Cal. 668, 674-675, 
166 P. 993 (1917) ; 5 Williston on Contracts (Rev. 
Ed. 1937), §1549, pp. 4344-4345; Rest., Contracts, 
§504, Comment c). 
* * * 
If no prior agreement or intention existed, 
then the only remedy is rescission; and if a case 
for rescission cannot be made out and a prior 
existing agreement or intention differing from the 
instrument before the court cannot be proved, then 
the instrument must stand as made. (66 Am. Jur. 2d 
§4 "Reformation of Instruments," p. 530). 
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* * * 
The court cannot rewrite the contract which the 
parties have made so as to express an agreement 
which they did not enter into. A court has no power 
to supply an agreement which was never made. . . A 
court should not, under the guise of reformation, 
write into a written agreement a term or provision 
which was not earlier agreed to by the parties 
themselves. (66 Am. Jur. 2d §5 "Reformation of 
Instruments," pp. 530-532). 
One may not employ a suit for reformation of a 
contract for the purpose of making an entirely new 
agreement. Such suits are only to establish and 
perpetuate an already existing contract, and to make 
it express the real intent of the parties as such 
intent existed at the time of the making of the 
agreement. A court of equity is not empowered to 
supply be decree an agreement which was never made. 
It is not empowered to amend and alter a contract . 
. . by inserting therein words, terms or conditions 
on which there was never a meeting of the minds. It 
is the duty of the courts to enforce contracts which 
the parties themselves have made and not to make new 
and different contracts for the parties or to make 
significant additions thereto and thus give to one 
or more parties, benefits and advantages on which 
the minds of the contracting parties have never met. 
(Sullivan v. Marsh, 225 P. 2d 872 at 872 (Mont. 
1950)). 
A mere mistake in the agreement, if unilateral, will not 
permit reformation. The mistake must be mutual and common to 
both parties as well as the existence of other terms mutually 
agreed upon. Unless both the mistake and the omitted agree-
ment are common to both contracting parties, established by 
clear and convincing evidence, reformation will not lie. 
To reform an instrument upon the ground of 
mistake, the mistake must be of fact and not of law, 
mutual and common to both parties . . . (Kelley v. 
Riverside Blvd. Ind. Church of God, 44 111. App. 3d 
673, 3 111. Dec. 298, 358 N.E. 2d 696, 707 (1976), 
citing, Ambarann Corp. v. Old Ben Coal Corp., 395 
111. 154, 166, 69 N.E. 2d 835, 841 (1946)). 
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A "mutual mistake" is one common to both 
contracting parties, wherein each labors under the 
same misconception. Thus when there is a mutual 
mistake the parties are in actual agreement, but the 
agreement in its written form does not express the 
parties' real interest. (See, Black's Law Diction-
ary (5th Ed. 1979), p. 920). 
A mutual mistake, for which an instrument will 
be reformed, is one which is reciprocal and common 
to both parties, each alike laboring under the same 
misconception in respect to the terms of the written 
instrument. It is a mistake shared by both parties 
to the instrument at the time of reducing their 
agreement to writing, and the mistake is mutual if 
the contract has been written in terms which violate 
the understanding of both parties—that is, if it 
appears both have done what neither intended. * * 
* The mistake cannot be mutual if the minds of the 
parties did not meet in a common intent. (66 Am. 
Jur. 2d §23 "Reformation of Instruments" p. 551) 
(citations omitted). 
Indeed, when the right to reform an instrument 
is based solely on a mistake, it is necessary that 
the mistake be mutual, and that both parties 
understood the contract as the complaint alleges it 
ought to have been, and as in fact it was except for 
the mistake. . . An instrument cannot be reformed 
where the minds of the parties did not meet in a 
pre-existing agreement. (66 Am. Jur. 2d §22 
"Reformation of Instruments" p. 550-51). 
Not only have the Plaintiffs not been able to establish 
by "clear and convincing evidence" the mutual agreement of the 
parties as to the omitted terms, the evidence shows convinc-
ingly, even uncontrovertedly, that not even knowledge or 
discussion of those terms occurred, let alone acquiescence in 
the same. For that reason the equity jurisdiction ought not 
to permit reformation, or more accurately, "formation" of an 
agreement the parties never made! 
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It is elementary and basic "black-letter" law that before 
any enforceable agreement comes into existence, the parties 
must have come to a "meeting of the minds" on all essential 
portions or terms of the contract. 
The principle is fundamental that a party 
cannot be held to have contracted if there was no 
assent, and this is so both as to express contracts 
and contracts implied in fact. There must be mutual 
assent or a meeting of the minds on all essential 
elements or terms in order to form a binding 
contract. (17 Am. Jur. 2d "Contracts" §18 p. 354). 
This case is entirely devoid of any evidence which would 
suggest that the parties ever agreed upon the amount of the 
indebtedness being guarantied. The amount being guarantied is 
a term so fundamental to the contract that the absence of 
evidence of assent to a specified amount or formula renders a 
Guaranty Agreement which does not contain such a provision 
absolutely void and unenforceable. 
POINT V 
THE GUARANTY AGREEMENTS WERE EITHER NOT VALIDLY ASSIGNED 
BY R & P TO CONTINENTAL BANK, OR, IF ASSIGNED, BECAME 
UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THE ASSIGNMENT CHANGED 
THE NATURE OF THE GUARANTIES 
On October Z, 1980, Color Craft, Moxley, OfMara, and 
Cullimore signed and created the following instruments: 
1. A MACHINERY CONTRACT with attached Exhibits A - E 
thereof (Exhibit 42). 
2. Three Promissory Notes (Exhibits 43, 44, 45). 
3. Nine Guaranty Agreements (Exhibits 43, 44, 45 
attachments; Exhibits 47, 48, 49). 
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Then, on October 8., 1980, R & P executed a "SELLER'S 
ASSIGNMENT" which specifically enumerated documents or rights 
assigned by R & P to Continental Bank: 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED • • . the undersigned 
(Roberts & Porter) hereby sells, assigns and 
transfers to CINB all rights, title and interest of 
the undersigned in and to: 
(i) the installments payable under the . 
. . Conditional Sale Contract dated October 7, 
1980 . . . between the undersigned and Color 
Craft . . . , and 
(ii) all of the rights of the undersigned 
under said Contract. 
* * * 
• . . all right, title and interest of the 
undersigned in and to 
(A) the property [Presses], . . . 
(B) all replacements . . . , 
(C) all proceeds . . . 
(SELLERfS ASSIGNMENT, October 8, 1980 Exhibit 52). 
At the time of this "assignment" none of the Limited 
Partner Guaranty Agreements existed. Nor, although specifi-
cally mentioning other assigned documents, does the "assign-
ment" refer to or even purport to "assign" any rights of R & P 
in the Guaranty Agreements. 
Even if said assignment is held to pass to Continental 
Bank rights against the Limited Partners by implication, the 
assignment of the Machinery Contract materially changed the 
nature of the obligations and rights of Color Craft and its 
Limited Partners thereby voiding said assignment. 
In February 1983, the Limited Partners filed an action 
against R & P alleging, inter alia, the existence of numerous 
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defects in the Nebiolo Press which allegedly resulted in a 
breach of the MACHINERY CONTRACT, or, alternatively R & P was 
in default thereof, relieving the Partnership of the obliga-
tion to complete the purchase of the press. (Complaint, 
February, 1983 Exhibit 104). 
Said action was automatically stayed against R & P by 
virtue of the filing by R & P of voluntary Bankruptcy, but the 
chose-in action was later purchased by Continental Bank at an 
auction held in the Bankruptcy Court. (Exhibits 105, 108) 
After Continental Bank, as alleged assignee, filed this 
action the Limited Partners filed a Counter Claim alleging the 
same defects and claims asserted in the action against R & P 
as a defense to the obligation to pay Continental Bank. 
(Counterclaim filed herein). On Motion of Continental Bank 
the Trial Court granted Summary Judgment dismissing, no cause 
of action, said Counterclaim on the grounds and for the 
reasons that Continental Bank was insulated from said claims 
by virtue of its status as an "assignee" of R & P and the 
operative effect of the following provision of the MACHINERY 
CONTRACT: 
SECURITY INTEREST . . . 
(c) Purchaser agrees not to assert against an 
assignee of Seller any claim or defense which 
purchaser may assert against Seller. (emphasis 
added) (MACHINERY CONTRACT, page 2 Exhibit 42). 
The "assignment" to Continental Bank does not, therefore, 
create a cause of action for two reasons. First, the pur-
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ported "ASSIGNMENT" does not recite that it includes the 
Guaranty Agreements, nor could it do so, since the assignment 
by R & P to Continental Bank occurred on October 8, 1980, 
weeks before the Guaranty Agreements of Limited Partners ever 
came into existence. Second, such after-acquired rights by R 
& P are not covered by the SELLER'S ASSIGNMENT and are non-
assignable. 
As a general rule, in order to be assignable, 
an estate or interest in property must have an 
actual or potential existence and be in the actual 
or potential possession of the assignor at the time 
of the assignment. Rights growing out of circum-
stances which do not yet exist are not assignable, 
even for value, for there is no subject matter on 
which to operate. An assignment of a thing not in 
existence gives only an equitable right. (6A 
C.J.S., "ASSIGNMENTS", §14, page 605-606). 
Under Illinois law guaranties are generally not assign-
able at alll 
The general rule in Illinois is that guaranties 
are non-assignable. (Second National Bank of Peoria 
v. Diefendorf (1878), 90 111. 396.) This rule, 
however, is not applied automatically rather the 
courts will examine the facts of each case to 
determine whether the policy underlying the rule is 
applicable. The rule is a corollary of general 
contract principles that a party may be held only to 
the precise obligation which it undertook. (Shranz 
v. Grossman, 90 111. App. 3d 507, 45 111. Dec. 654, 
412 N.E.2d 1378, 1384 (1980)). 
More significant, under Illinois law, where some material 
alteration is made in the liability of the guarantor, any 
assignment of such a guaranty renders the guaranty void. 
This rule was first adopted by the Illinois Supreme court 
in Second National Bank of Peoria v. Diefendorf, 90 111. 396, 
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407 (1878) and recognized, in spite of, or perhaps because of, 
its antiquity, in Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Stephans, 
97 111. App. 3d 683, 52 111- Dec. 927, 422 N.E. 2d 1136 
(1981). The rule, as articulated by the Illinois Supreme 
Court is as follows: 
Illinois recognized the general principal of 
non-assignability of guaranties for which defendants 
contend . . . that rule is not applied mechanically, 
however; the facts of each case determine whether 
the policy underlying the rule applies. Thus, the 
guarantor is not released unless the "* * * essen-
tials of the original contract have * * * been 
changed and the performance required of the princi-
pal is * * * materially different from that first 
contemplated. 
* * * 
Furthermore, under the present law the test of 
whether a guaranty may be transferred is not whether 
new credit is extended after the transfer, but 
whether the obligations of the parties to the 
guaranty have thereby changed. (422 N.E. 2d 1139). 
In the case at bar, the effect of the assignment from R & 
P to Continental Bank was to change the nature of the contract 
being personally guarantied from "conditional" and "defen-
sible" to "unconditional" and "indefensible." This was 
accomplished by virtue of the afore-described written provi-
sion of the MACHINERY CONTRACT waiving all defenses against 
assignees which could have been asserted against the assignor. 
The GUARANTY AGREEMENTS are, therefore, "materially 
altered" by virtue of the assignment and the assignment is not 
the mere changing of named "payees" which permitted continuing 
enforceability in Illinois under the Harris rule. Since the 
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assignment would materially alter the liability of the 
Partnership, and, ultimately the Limited Partners, the 
assignment is void and Continental Bank has no standing to sue 
in this matter. 
POINT VI 
THE CONTRACT PROVIDED FOR SIGNED DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING PERSONAL 
GUARANTIES AND RELIANCE ON THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREE-
MENT PROVIDING THE OBLIGATION TO SIGN WAS INSUFFICIENT 
AND UNACCEPTABLE TO R & P OR THE BANK 
The Bank argues that if it does not have enforceable 
agreements with the Limited Partners, the Court should 
construe the Limited Partnership Agreement as either compel-
ling the Partners' signatures thereon, or accepting the 
obligation to sign as sufficient in itself to create liabi-
lity. While that doctrine may be invoked in circumstances 
where there is no question as to the salient terms and 
provisions of the Guaranty Agreement, e.g., Lawndale Steel Co. 
V. Appel, 98 111. App. 3d 167, 423 N.E. 2d 957 (3d Dist. 
1981), it is restricted to cases where specific performance is 
not prohibited because of the uncertainty of the agreed-upon 
terms and provisions. 
Furthermore, the Bank now asks this Court to give it what 
it refused to accept in the contract formation. The testimony 
is clear that the Bank refused to accept the internal partner-
ship promise to guaranty, rather, insisting on signed docu-
ments instead. (Trans. Vol. II, pp. 383-84) 
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Under both Illinois and/or Utah law, liability based upon 
an obligation to pay a debt owed by another is governed by the 
Statute of Frauds and clearly bars recovery against the non-
signing Limited Partners as a matter of law: 
Illinois 
No action shall be brought, whereby to charge . 
. . the defendant upon any special promise to answer 
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another 
person, . . . unless the promise or agreement upon 
which such action shall be brought, or some memoran-
dum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed 
by the party to be charged therewith, or some other 
person thereunto by him lawfully authorized. (ILL. 
REV. STAT. Ch. 59, §1) . 
Utah 
In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or memoran-
dum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
to be charged therewith: 
* * * 
(2) Every promise to answer for the 
debt, default or miscarriage of another. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §25-5-4(2) 
Although the evidence tacitly indicates that the non-
signors "intended" to execute a Guaranty Agreement if properly 
filled out, the fact remains that the ultimate intention never 
came to fruition by obtaining the signatures of said Limited 
Partners. Such a void cannot, moreover, be remedied by a suit 
in equity for "reformation" to compel, in fact or by operation 
of law, the Limited Partner's signature. 
In accordance with the rule that a court of 
equity will not and cannot reform an invalid or void 
instrument, a court of equity has no power, under 
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the pretense of reformation, so to construct or 
reconstruct a contract as to make a complete 
contract out of one which, on its face, was incom-
plete or insufficient to meet the requirements of 
the statute of frauds, and this is true irrespective 
of any intention of the parties to conform to the 
requirements of the statute, and of the fact that 
their failure to do so arose from mistake or 
ignorance. So too, and although there is some 
authority to the contrary, it is generally held that 
where a memorandum is insufficient to meet the 
requirements of the statute of frauds, the memoran-
dum may not be reformed, on the ground that to do so 
would be to nullify the statute. 
* * * A contract signed by one party only, 
and void for lack of consideration, will not be 
reformed in equity so as to embody the terms of a 
prior oral contract void under the statute of 
frauds. Likewise, a court of equity cannot supply a 
signature of a party . . . (66 Am. Jur. 2d §38 
"Reformation of Instruments" pp. 562-63). 
POINT VII 
IF, AS THE BANK ARGUES, CULLIMORE IS PERSONALLY LIABLE ON 
THE NOTES, THE NOTES DO NOT CONSTITUTE A PARTNERSHIP DEBT 
WHICH LIMITED PARTNERS WOULD BE LIABLE FOR EITHER 
UNDER PERSONAL GUARANTY AGREEMENTS OR THE 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
The evidence is clear that the blank guaranty forms and 
the "contract" to be guarantied therein referred to the three 
separate promissory notes signed by Moxley, O'Mara, and 
Cullimore (Exhibits 43, 44 and 45; trans. Vol II, pp.250-51; 
pp. 341-379) Moxley, O'Mara, and Cullimore each signed one 
guaranty form for each note. The same form was used with the 
Limited Partners only now the Bank wants the singular word 
"contract" within the text of the Guaranty Agreements to be 
interpreted as all three notes; the inconsistency is apparent. 
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Furthermore, if, as the Bank argues, the failure of 
Cullimore to designate by his signature his representative 
capacity causes the notes to be his personal obligations (he 
not being a general partner of Color Craft) then the Limited 
Partners are not responsible for guarantying Cullimore's 
personal debts. 
SUMMARY 
For the reasons stated in this and Appellants' Opening 
Brief, the Judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed 
dismissing, no cause of action the Bank's claims against the 
Limited Partners. The Trial Court's determination that the 
Guaranty Agreements were unenforceable should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /<??£— day of May, 1989. 
Harold A. Hintze 
Attorney for Defendants 
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